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Abstract
This paper analyses whether a welfare maximizing government should tax
or subsidize the home firms in an industry characterized by.
oligopolistic competition and differentiated products. The home firms
are assumed to be pure exporters. It is shown that a symmetric,
perfect Nash-equilibrium in the quantity setting game will involve an
export subsidy if the industry is fairly concentrated, if the relative
number of home firms is not too large and if the products are fairly
homogenous. The paper presents a reduced form 'expression which makes
this proposition precise. In the symmetric price setting game there is
an unambigous case for an export tax.
Not to be quoted without permission from author(s). Comments welcome.
I. Introduction
This paper presents a partial equilibrium analysis of whether a welfare maximizing gov-
ernment should tax or subsidize exporting firms in an imperfectly competitive industry.
Dixit (1984) found that in the case of homogenous products and quantity competition,
there is a case for an export subsidy if the number of home firmi is not to large. Eaton
and Grossman (1986) extended this analysis to the case of differentiated products. As-
suming the firms have consistent conjectures, they found that there in general will be a
case for an export tax. In this paper we also investigate the case of differentiated prod-
ucts, incorporating the case of identical products as a special case. In contrast to Eaton
- and Grossman, I employ the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium concept, investigating
both the case where the firms, regard quantities and prices as their strategy variables.
I find that when the firms regards quantities as their strategy- variable, it is ambigous
whether an optimal policy will involve a tax or a subsidy. The analysis shows that the
answer to the principal question addressed in this paper will depend on three parameters
in our model; the elasticity of substitution between the goods in this industry, the total
number of firms and the relative number of home firms. In the case of competition in
prices no ambiguity exists, and there is an unambigous case for an export tax.
In the next section I formalize the government's policy problem. Section 3 outlines
the model for the quantity setting game. In the next section, section 4, I present the
price-setting game. In the last section I discuss some shortcommings of the present
analysis.
2 The government's policy problem
In this section, I will formulate the governme;it's policy choice in a full information two
stage game framework. The industry I will investigate is characetrized by monopolistic
competition in differentiated products. The policy problem is viewed from the point
of view of the home-government, which can levy a tax or a subsidy on the domestic
producers. The domestic producers sell only on the world market, i.e. I limit the
discussion to purely exporting industries. Furthermore, I will only consider cases where
the government cannot influence the number of firms in the industry, i.e. there is a fixed
number of foreign and domestic firms. I assume that the goverment is able to commit
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itself to a policy action at the firs stage of the game. In the second stage of the game,
the firms chooses siraultanously their actions subject to the policy determined at the first
stage. I assume that all agents have full information. Abstracting from distortions in
the rest of the economy, and assuming lump sum taxes are available, the policy problem
is to maximize net revenue; tax income pluss profit for the domestic producers. Total
revenue (R) can be expressed
= E {(Pi — Ci)Xi — CF} 	(1)
JENA
where NA denotes the set of domestic producers, Pi is the price facing the consumer for
good i, C , X1 and CZ are respectively the varible costs, total production and the fixed
costa for firm i. I assume that there is only one firm producing each product. Let us
investigate the impact on total revenue of a change in the export tax (r)
dR
dr	 (Pi — co—)= •i	
(dpi
eNA	 ar	 ' dr
	 (2)
This simple equation incorporates several effects which will determine the sign on dRldr.
Basically there are two opposing forces when the goverment introduces a tax; the terms
of trade will improve, whereas there is a loss of marketshares. If we look at these effects
in more detail, we will see that they incorporate several issues. Firstly, we have to
consider the tax incidence effect, i.e. to what extent will the tax be passed on to the
foreign consumers and to what extent will the tax reduce the profit-margin of domestic
producers. Secondly, when calculating the effect on the sales of the taxed producers, we
have to consider to what extent the tax will influence the price charged by the producers
which are not taxed. Since a tax 'change influencing some producers also will affect the
market conditions for the other producers, we will in general expect the price charged
by the non-taxed producers to change. Hence, the total effect on the sales of the taxed
producers will be determined by a quite complicated set of effects.
In general, one can formulate the pricing rule of the producers by a mark-up formula
= 114Ci WE N
	
( 3 )
where N denotes the set of all producers, and .1i4 is the mark-up factor for firm i. It is
well known that this mark-up factor can be related to the 'percieved demand elasticity"
facing firm i (q) in the following way
= 1 — 1/ei WEN
Combining equations (2), (3) and (4) we obtain the expression
dR	 .
717 = E dPi ( 
e
1- -2-. )ieNA dr Ej
where I have introduced a variable ei.; which can be thought of as an elasticity of demand
facing firm i under the given tax-reform:
cif =-7. dPildr
For the sake of argument, let us assume that all domestic producers are identical (i.e.
they have the same cost-structure and face the same demand-conditions), except that
they produce different products. In this case it is straight forward to state the condition
which determines the direction of a welfare improving tax policy: From equation (5) we
can see that it will be welfare improving to tax an exporting industry if
Cr < E
	 (7)
where I have dropped the subscripts referring to individual firms. In the same way one
can conclude that it will be welfare improving to subsidize the domestic firms if the
inequality sign is reversed in equation (7).
3 The quantity setting game
In this section I will analyse a special model in order to see how the ambiguity of whether
to tax or subsidize can be referred back to the size of a few interesting parameters. The
model I will use is the model of imperfect competition developed by Spence (1976) and
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977). In this section I will look at the quantity-setting game, whereas
the price-setting game is investigated in the next section 1 .
3.1 The market equilibrium
Since this model is well known to practitioners in the field of international trade and
industrial organization, I will only give a brief description here.
The demand side
Let us assume that the representative consumer in the rest of the world has an exogenous
income (/), and a utility-function of the log-linear/CES-type
= (1 cf)) log Ir + co log r	 (8)
where Y is an index representing the aggregate of all other goods, and r is a CES-index
for the aggregate of the differentiated products produced in the industry in question 2
r
 LE xf'EN 
1/0 
(9)
11n a recent paper Anderson, de Palma and Thine (1987) show that there is an (or infact, infinitly
many) address model (location model) and a (infinitly many) discrete choice model which will give the
same market demand, pricing rule etc. as the Spence-Dixit-Stiglits model presentea above.
2The elasticity of substitution (a) between two goods in this aggregate is related to p by the expression
e = 1/(1 — p) .
Pi dXildr (6)
The consumers budget constraint can be expressed as follows
=	 E PiXi	 (10)
ieN
where Py is a price index for all other goods. Maximizing (8) subject to (9) and (10),
one obtains the implicit demand function for each differentiated product
[
WI 1—o
TFP 0 <p<1 WEN	 (11)
Equation (9) defines the demand for good i in an implicit way, since Xi appears both
on the left and the right hand side of equation (11). However, I am considering the
quantity-setting game in this section, so I want to keep quantities rather than prices of
the other goods in the demand function.
The firms' decision problem
The firms maximize profit
Hj
 = (Pi — Ci)Xi — CF  Vi E N 	 (12)
I •am looking for a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, and I assume that the firms have constant
marginal costs. This equilibrium is characterized by the set of first order conditions
•
= pPi(1 — fii) — = 0 Vi E NdXi
where I have introduced the auxiliary variable
Xicir
raxi
Employing the Nash-Cournot equilibrium concept, it is straight forward to show that 3
XfA =	 (15)
E'EN Xj
*Performing this exercise, it is quite widely claimed that this involves some sort of miscalculation on
behalf of the firms, since each firm seems to neglect the impact changes in its strategy choice has on
the strategy choices of all other firms. This is the startingpoint of the °conjectural variations approach.
However, according to Johansen (1982)  the non- cooperative Nash-equilibrium concept involves no mis-
calculation on behalf of the firms. Johansen explains how the set of first order conditions arises because
the firms are highly rational and have full information. The firms use the first order conditions in order
to determine the optimal strategy choices for all firms, i.e. the set of first order conditions identifies
the point in the (joint) strategy space, where no firm has any incentive to unilderally deviate. This
ihterpretation, of the Cournot equilibrium concept was also identified by Schumpeter (1954) who wrote:
"It is not true that (Cournot's) duopolist are supposed to act on an assumption ... that each (firm) takes
the quantity offered by the other as constant .... No such assumption is implied. All that is required is
that each chooses this particular method in order to find out how the other will react —' (p.980).
(13)
(14)
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which can be interpreted as a marketshare-indicator. From equations (4) and (13) it is
straight forward to show that the mark-up factor can be expressed
1
114 = / (1 M)	 (16)
From this expression I can see that there are two sources to a positive profit margin.
Firstly, since the firms products are inhomogenous, the firms can exploit their monpolistic
situation. Notice that as we approach the case of identical products (p approaches unity),
this - source or pure profit will vanish. Secondly, since the firms compete in quantities
there will be a positive margin since each firm can influence their terms of trade on their
marginal, but finite, market-share.
The market equilibrium is completly characterized by the equations (3) (11), (15)
and (16).
3.2 The impact of tax-changes on market equilibrium
In this section I will assume that all firms have the same marginal costs. The only
differences between the finns is whether they are located in the home-country or in
the rest of the world, and that they produce different products. I will in this section
investigate the impact of the introduction of a tax (or subsidy) on the domestic firms,
starting from laissez faire (no taxes).
In the Appendix A I have shown how to derive reduced form expressions for the
changes of the market equilibrium when an export-tax is introduced. We need the
, following expressions
	dPA (n — 1)(1 — P) + Pv
	(17)
PA 	 — 1 — p(n -- 2)
Iwhere have introduced the subscript
dr
	A in order to refer to changes in the variables
for firms located in the home country. I have also introduced the auadllary variables v,
where v nA/n; nA is the number of domestic firms, and n is the total number of firms
in the industry.
From equation (17) we can analyse the tax-incidence question: The tax is to a larger
extent passed over to the consumers the less homogenous the products are. Furthermore,
we find that the tax is passed over to the consumer to a larger extent the larger is the
relative number otdomestic producers.
In Appendix A, I have also identified the impact of taxation on the sales by domestic
firms:•
1 dXA	 n — 1 — pv(n -- 2)
	(18)X A dr	 n -- 1 — p(n — 2)
From this equation I can see that the the loss of sales for the domestic producers will :
be larger, the higher is the degree of homogeneity between the products in the industry.
The larger is the relative number of domestic firms in the industry, the less will the taxed
firms lose their sales.
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Figure 1: The T(v, p; n)=0 lines for different values of n
3.3 Taxing or subsidizing?
We have now the results we need in order to address the primary question posed in
the title of this paper: Should a welfare-maximizing government tax or subsidize an
exporting industry? By combining equations (4), (16), (17) and (18), one can show that
this depends on whether
T (v, p; n) = (z. — 1/n)(n — 1) — pv(n — 3 + 2/n) (19)
is positive or negative (remember that 0 < v, p < 1,n > 3). This function has been
plotted in figure 1. From figure 1 we can draw several rules of thumb characterizing the
answer to the principal problem we set out to answer. Notice that there is a case for an
export subsidy north-west of the "T = in the figure, and a case for an export tax
in the south-eastern part of the figure.
Proposition 1 The higher the relative number of domestic firms in the industry, the
more ia an optimal policy pulled in the direction of an export tax.
Remark I The explanation for this result follows from equations (17) and (18). There
are two effects to take into consideration: Firstly, a tax has a negative effect on sales for
domestic firms. This effect will be smaller the larger is the number of taxed firms, i.e.
the number of home firms. Secondly, the tax will to a larger extent be passed over to
the consumers, i.e. improve the ternis of trade,
the larger is the number of home firms.
Remark 2 This result is in accordance with Dixit (1984), who showed that in the case
of homogenous products, the case for an export subsidy depends on the number of home
firms.
Proposition 2 In industries where there is a high elasticity of substitution (relatively
homogenous products), there is a case for an export subsidy and vice versa.
Remark 3 The driving force behind this proposition is the profit-shifting motive: An
export subsidy raises domestic revenue by transferring industry profit to the domestic
firms. In the case of duopoly this argument has been analysed by Brander-Spencer (1985)
and Eaton-Grossman (1986).
Proposition 3 The more firms in the industry, the more is an optimal policy pulled in
the direction of an export tax.
Remark 4 The intuition behind this result goes back to the simple fact that the more
firms in the industry the less profit (arr. eq. (16)). Hence, the more firms in the industry
the less important is the profit-shifting motive referred to above.
4 The case of price-setting firms
4.1 Nash-Bertrand market equilibrium
In this case I want to have the competitors' prices in the demand function facing each
firm, rather than quantities (cfr. eq. (11). It is well known that in this case the demand
function can be expressed
24. = 
EIEN Pre
	 (20)
where a = 1 1 0 6 and a > 1).
To identify the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in this case we have to find the set of
prices which solves the set of first order conditions
dlli	 dXi.
, = -I- (Pi — Ci)Tf3; = 0 Vi E N
Following the same procedure as in section 3 it is straight forward to show that
0' -	 1)/ci
(a — 1)(1 --
where I have introduced
EieN
4.2 A case for taxing!
In Appendix B I have shown how to derive the demand elasticity e (defined by equa-
tion (6)) in the case where all firms have the same marginal costs. I have furthermore
shown that in this case 8, < e, hence I have established the following proposition:
Proposition 4 /n the case where firms compete in prices there is an unambigov,s case
for an export tax.
114
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Shortcommings of this analysis
In this paper I have given some rules of thumb for whether a welfare maodmazing gov-
ernment will tax or subsidize an exporting industry. In the case of quantity competition,
the answer depends on the degree of homogeneity of the products in the industry, the
relative number of home firms and the absolute number of firms in the industry. In the
case of price competition, there is an unambigous case for taxing.
However, there are several shortcomming of the present analysis. Firstly, one would
like to investigate the case of endogenous number of finns. However, an analytical
treatment of this case usually requires a large number of firms, so equilibrium profit
can be set approxirnatly equal to zero. This eliminates the profit- shifting motive for
subsidizing, and the problem becomes trivial. To treat the whole problem, one
probably has to use numerical analysis, along the lines of e.g. Venables and Smith (1987).
Secondly, this analysis has not incorporated the possibility of home consumption.
This is considered outside the scope of the present paper (see Eaton and Grossman
(1986) for a discussion of the significance of home consumption).
Thirdly, one might &pie that the partial equlibrium approach is a weak spot. In or-
der to elucidate this point, let us first stick to the case where there is no other distortions
in the economy and lump-sum taxes are avialable. In this case the limitiations of the
present analysis is not important, since I have only addressed the qualitative question of
whether to tax or subsidize. The new effects from a general equilibrium analysis should
be fairly easy to predict in this case. The main effect would be that factorprices would
be influenced by tax-changes, i.e. that one cannot assume that unit costs will remain
constant as I did above. However, this effect will only influence the magnitude of the
optimal tax or subsidy, and not the direction of the tax- reform. The limitations of the
partial, equilibrium approach becomes more important . when one takes into consideration
the distortions in the rest of the economy. Take the case considered by Dixit and Gross-
man (1984), where there are more imperfectly competitive industries in the economy.
Their point is that a subsidy to one industry will draw resources out of the other, which,
however might also be inclined to recieve a subsidy according to the partial equilibrium
analysis above. In this case one have to consider the quantitative differences between the
sectors in question.4
 Another pervasive kind of distortion in actual economies is taxes
on factors of production. A satisfactory analysis of the problem would involve shadow-
prices of the factors of production faced by the industry. This is probably analytically
intractable in most cases and indicate the need for simulation approaches even to obtain
only qualitative results.
Lastly; I will stick to a ,widespread tradition in this field; it is a quite common
practice to withdraw from the conclusions carefully obtained in the very last moment.
Economists seem to be strongly attracted to the non-intervetion position in this field,
despite the numerous results obtained indicating that it might be welfare improving for
a country to intervene in imperfectly competitive trading industries. The justification
'Notice that the government might be in the fortunate position that it would be welfare Improving
to tax some industries and subsidize others. In such a situation a tax-reform in one industry could also
have indirect benefical effects in other industries.
is that intervention by one government will be at the expense of the producers or/and
consumers in other countries. The total outcome of unilateral welfare optimization by
each individual country would most likely be inferior to the cooperative welfare optimum.
6 Hence one could argue that the primary achivement of the kind of analysis outlined
above is to show the need for international agreements in order to offset the incentives I
have identified to introduce unilateral trade restrictions.
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Appendix A: Tax-changes in the quantity setting game
In this appendix I will derive the impact on equilibrium in the quantity-setting game,
of the introduction of an export tax on the home producers. I assume in this case that
the home government chooses its tax policy in the first stage of the game, and that the
firms in this industry simultanously chooses their level of production in the second stage
of this game. I am looking for the direction of the government tax-policy, i.e. whether it
should tax or subsidize the home-firms, in a perfect Nash equilibrium (dr. Selten (1975))
in this two stage game.
Let us start by modifying the price setting rule to incorporate an ad valorem tax at
rate r:
In order to obtain the final results, I will logarithmically differentiate the set of market
equilibrium conditions, consisting of equations (11) and (24):
dzi(1 – p) dpi pdi 0	 (25)
	dr 	 iJi
	
dpi =
11
d	 (26)
-f-r 
where I have introduced the notational convention that lower case letters corresponds
to the lokarithm of the corresponding upper case variable.  I will investigate the case of
deviations from
 the no tax situation, assuming furthermore that all firms have the same
marginal costs of production. In this case the only interesting distinction between the
firms will be whether they belong to the set of home firms (denoted by NA), or foreign
firms (the set denoted by NB). I will also use the notation that the subscript A refers
to home firms, whereas the subscript B refers to foreign firms. From equation (26) one
then obtains
di3A
/	dpA = dr	 1	 (27)1 ---	 n
noticing that
	= 1/n WE N 	(28)
in the no tax, symmetric case. n is the number of firms in the industry. Furthermore
dI3B
	
dpB = 	 lin
	(29)
Using the definition of
 ß (dr. equation (15)) it is straight forward to show that
dßA= p(1 – v) (dzA clzB)
n
dPB = —Pv (dxB
n
where I have introduced
v nA
	
(32)
=	
r) (24)
P(1 /54)
(30)
(31)
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From the definition of r (cfr. equation (9)) one obtains
	
= vdxA -I- (1 - v)dx/3	 (33)
From the set of demand equations (dr. eq. (11)), we obtain the two last equations:
&A (1 - P)+ dpA + pd-f = 0
	
(34)
dx13(1- p) dpB + pc17 = 0 	 (35)
The set of equations (27), (29), (30), (31), (33), (34) and (35) determines completely
the set of unknowns dxA, dzB,dpA,dpA,(113A,c113B and d7. After some manipulations one
obtains the final results (when n > 3)
STA	 n - 1 - pv(n - 2)
dr = n - 1 - p(n - 2)
Moreover
dpA (n - 1)(1 p) pv
dr - n 1 - p(n - 2) •
Appendix B: Impact of tax changes in the price setting
game
In this appendix, I will show that condition (7) is always fulfilled in the symmetric
price setting game. By totally differentiating the (implicit) demand function defined by
equation (20), it is straight forward to show that
-ef=1÷(v+cr-vcr) (1 dpBIdr )dpAldr
From equations (4) and (22) one can see that
4 = e(1. -	 (39)
where
P
'
'—s = 	 (4°)
E'EN Pl-a
In the symmetric equilibrium ir.i = 1/n. Furthermore, by totally differentiating (40) one
obtain
dicA	 (dpB dPA
= 11n(o. - 1)(1 - v)	 -	 (41)dr	 dr	 dr
cbcBdPB)
= 1/n(o- - 1), ( dPA -dr	 dr	 dr (42)
From equation (22) it follows that
drni dj 
dr = - 11 n)(cr(1 1/n) - 1 E A, B	 (43)
(36)
(37)
(38)
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Lastly, in the same way as (27) and (29)
	dPA	 dmA
= ÷
	 r 	 dr
dpB _ dmB
dr	 dr
Combining equations (41), (42), (43), (44) and (45), one can show that
dpB I dr	 v(er — 1) 
dpAl dr = (n 7 1» — (o. — 1)(1 — v — 1/n)
Inserting (38) and (39) into equation (7) and replacing a by 1/(1 — p) one obtain the
following condition for a tax to be welfare improving
	
/41 — 1/n) 1. 	vp
1 — vp	 n — 1 — p(1 v — lin)
which indeed is true for all permissable values for p and v.
( 4 4
(45)
(46)
(47)
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